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Abstract
Background: A rural pharmacy initiative (RPI) designed to increase access to medicines in rural Kyrgyzstan
created a network of 12 pharmacies using a revolving drug fund mechanism in 12 villages where no pharmacies
previously existed. The objective of this study was to determine if the establishment of the RPI resulted in the
unforeseen benefit of triggering medicine price competition in pre-existing (non-RPI) private pharmacies located
in the region.
Methods: We conducted descriptive and multivariate analyses on medicine insurance claims data from
Kyrgyzstan's Mandatory Health Insurance Fund for the Jumgal District of Naryn Province from October 2003 to
December 2007. We compared average quarterly medicine prices in competitor pharmacies before and after the
introduction of the rural pharmacy initiative in October 2004 to determine the RPI impact on price competition.
Results: Descriptive analyses suggest competitors reacted to RPI prices for 21 of 30 (70%) medicines.
Competitor medicine prices from the quarter before RPI introduction to the end of the study period decreased
for 17 of 30 (57%) medicines, increased for 4 of 30 (13%) medicines, and remained unchanged for 9 of 30 (30%)
medicines. Among the 9 competitor medicines with unchanged prices, five initially decreased in price but later
reverted back to baseline prices. Multivariate analyses on 19 medicines that met sample size criteria confirm these
findings. Fourteen of these 19 (74%) competitor medicines changed significantly in price from the quarter before
RPI introduction to the quarter after RPI introduction, with 9 of 19 (47%) decreasing in price and 5 of 19 (26%)
increasing in price.
Conclusions: The RPI served as a market driver, spurring competition in medicine prices in competitor
pharmacies, even when they were located in different villages. Initiatives designed to increase equitable access to
medicines in rural regions of developing and transitional countries should consider the potential to leverage
medicine price competition as a means of achieving their goal. Evaluations of interventions to increase rural access
to medicines should include impact assessment on both formal and informal pharmaceutical markets.
Published: 14 December 2009
International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:43 doi:10.1186/1475-9276-8-43
Received: 30 August 2009
Accepted: 14 December 2009
This article is available from: http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/43
© 2009 Waning et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Page 1 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:43 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/43Background
Equitable access to medicines remains a challenge in
developing and transitional countries, especially among
the rural poor. Pharmacies in densely populated areas are
always more lucrative, often leaving sparsely-populated
rural regions without access to reliable sources of medi-
cines within reasonable proximity. Even when pharma-
cies are physically present, medicines are often
unaffordable, and their availability can be erratic because
of failing public financing and supply chain management
systems [1-11]. Understanding that a large number of
people in developing countries seek care and medicines
from the private sector, numerous private sector interven-
tions have been mounted; however, a 2007 systematic
review of private sector interventions on quality and utili-
zation of care by the poor revealed an insufficient evi-
dence base for those wishing to increase access to health
services through private sector interventions [12].
One of the more commonly used mechanisms to address
inequities in rural access to medicines has been the estab-
lishment of revolving drug funds, whereby a capital
investment allows for the initial purchase of medicines
and revenues from medicine sales or user fees are used to
replenish stock. Sustainable and successful schemes have
been described across Africa, South East Asia, and the
Former Soviet Union [13-22]. More frequently, however,
the literature reveals the failure of revolving drug funds to
accomplish their objectives [14,15,22-34].
The design and management challenges of revolving drug
funds that Cross et al [22] described in 1986 remain rele-
vant today, nearly a quarter of a century later. Most note-
worthy for our study is the inability of most schemes to
adopt a business approach to their operations and prac-
tices, including a failure to assess the potential market and
insufficient planning and marketing [22]. The concept of
revolving drug funds has evolved into more sophisticated,
business-focused initiatives, such as the Tanzanian
Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlets and the Ghanaian
CAREshops [6,35]. However, we have found no evidence
that either these more advanced initiatives or the tradi-
tional revolving drug funds have been described or evalu-
ated with regard to their impact on the existing
pharmaceutical market in a given region.
Kyrgyzstan, like many developing and transitional coun-
tries, struggles to ensure access to medicines in rural
regions. Approximately 64% of Kyrgyzstanis live in pre-
dominantly mountainous rural regions [36]. In participa-
tory research sessions involving more than 80% of
households in Naryn Province (n = 27,266), rural resi-
dents prioritized geographic access to pharmacies as the
number one determinant of health in their communities
[37]. In 2004, it was estimated that more than 300 rural
villages in Kyrgyzstan had no physical access to pharma-
cies and medicines [38]. A number of factors underlie this
absence of rural pharmacies: all pharmacies were priva-
tized during health reforms following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and would-be entrepreneurs believed
pharmaceutical markets in rural regions were insufficient
and unviable. A shortage of pharmacists in rural areas,
combined with national policies that mandate pharma-
cies be staffed by pharmacists, created yet another deter-
rent to starting rural pharmacies.
When pharmacies are present in rural Kyrgyzstan, medi-
cines are often unaffordable to the poor. The Kyrgyzstan
Mandatory Health Insurance Fund covers medicines for
approximately 80% of the population [39]. This insur-
ance benefit, however, is administered through contracted
private pharmacies concentrated in highly populated
regions, and although rural residents are eligible for the
medicines insurance benefit, they live too far away from
contracted pharmacies to actually access it. Meanwhile,
outpatient medicine purchases were the fastest growing
component of out-of-pocket health expenditures from
2000 to 2003, increasing more than two-fold over this
time period [40]. A 2005 evaluation in Jumgal District
found that out-of-pocket costs for treatment of hyperten-
sion can represent up to 71% of non-food consumption
per capita [38].
In 2005, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health responded to the
pharmacist human resource issue by changing the law to
allow nurses to dispense medicines in pharmacies in rural
regions after completing a two-week training course. A
non-governmental organization (NGO), in collaboration
with the Kyrgyz-Swiss Health Reform Support Project,
Jumgal Village Health Committees, and the Kyrgyzstan
Mandatory Health Insurance Fund, launched a rural phar-
macy initiative (RPI) in Jumgal District. The RPI estab-
lished pharmacies in 12 villages under a revolving drug
fund mechanism. The RPI pharmacies were located in
government-owned clinics and contracted with nurses
already in the clinics to dispense medicines. To avoid dis-
rupting the private market, the RPI management refrained
from setting up pharmacies in Chaek, the district center,
where a few pharmacies already existed. These private
pharmacies also had outlets in two larger villages in Jum-
gal. A description of key features of the RPI is provided in
Table 1.
While no distinct policy was created to establish medicine
prices in the RPI, the management applied minimal mark-
ups sufficient to cover their estimated operating costs.
Retail mark-ups initially averaged approximately 30-50%
for most medicines. Surprisingly, as the rural pharmacy
initiative emerged, the private pharmacies in the district
center appeared to be changing their prices on key medi-Page 2 of 15
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area villages. Anecdotal reports and interviews with own-
ers of private pharmacies in Chaek suggested that the RPI
had an unplanned impact on overall medicine prices,
even in the district center where the RPI was not operat-
ing.
The potential of these types of rural pharmacy initiatives
to induce medicine price competition has profound
implications for Kyrgyzstan and beyond. While scores of
studies have been conducted to describe the unaffordabil-
ity of medicines [7,9,11], few publications provide evi-
dence-based guidance on how to decrease medicine prices
so they are more affordable. The purpose of this study,
therefore, is to determine if the RPI actually achieved the
unforeseen benefit of triggering price competition in
nearby private competitor pharmacies.
Methods
We obtained six lists of medicines covered by the Kyrgyz
Mandatory Health Insurance Fund from 2002-2007 along
with pharmaceutical claims data (n = 162,999 claims) for
the period October 2003-December 2007 for the districts
Ak Taala, Alai, At Bashi, Jumgal, Kochkor, Naryn, Tok-
togul, and Ton. We cleaned insurance claims data in sev-
eral steps, excluding the following: reimbursement
equaled zero; those where patient co-pay plus reimburse-
ment did not equal total reimbursement; those with
invalid package sizes; and those where the difference in
published and actual reimbursement rates exceeded 20%.
Differences in published and actual reimbursement prices
result from a delay in actually distributing the revised
published lists to the more than 300 contracted pharma-
cies throughout the region. We then excluded all non-
Jumgal claims and all claims for medicines not on the list
of top 30 selling medicines by volume, resulting in a final
analytic data set of 18,012 Jumgal claims, which included
6,795 and 11,217 claims from RPI and competitor phar-
macies, respectively (Figure 1).
We examined RPI and competitor prices using both sim-
ple descriptive and multivariate analyses. Since the RPI
was first introduced in October 2004, this study period
allows for a one-year observation period of competitor
medicines prices before the introduction of the RPI and
more than three years of observation for both RPI and
competitor pharmacies afterwards. All prices are provided
as price per unit (price per tablet or price per injection) in
Kyrgyz Som.
For descriptive purposes, we calculated competitor price
changes by comparing their average price for the last quar-
ter observed in the study to their average price in the quar-
ter preceding the first RPI price observed. Competitor final
price changes are presented as percent price changes (Figure
2, Table 2) and calculated as follows: ((average pricelast
quarter - average pricequarter before RPI introduction)/average price-
quarter before RPI introduction) × 100. We plotted examples of
competitor price changes for medicines that exhibited
price decreases, price increases, and no price changes (Fig-
Table 1: Key features of the Rural Pharmacy Initiative
Key Feature Description
Buy-in and Support Popular consensus that access to medicines is the number one health determinant in communities
Involvement of Village Health Committees in the design of the RPI and refurbishment of pharmacy outlets
Political will of the Kyrgyz authorities, and support from international organizations and the Mandatory 
Health Insurance Fund
Cost Savings and Income Co-location of RPI outlets in existing government- owned health clinics, resulting in free rent and utilities
Co-location of the RPI headquarters in government offices in the capital city, resulting in free rent and 
utilities
Revenue stream assured by contractual arrangement between RPI pharmacies and the Mandatory Health 
Insurance Fund for administration of state-funded medicines benefit
Human Resources and Oversight Contractual arrangements with existing nurses, paying them a modest bonus for their part-time pharmacy 
activities
Availability of a highly-qualified pharmacist to manage the central RPI warehouse
NGO managers' exceptional technical capacity in pharmaceutical management and their contributions of a 
great deal of personal time to support the RPIPage 3 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:43 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/43ures 3, 4, 5, and 6). The Health Insurance Fund reimburse-
ment prices are provided as a reference but are not meant
to be an indicator of retail prices. The reimbursement
price is the amount reimbursed to pharmacies by the
Health Insurance Fund, whereby the patient pays the dif-
ference between the retail and reimbursement prices. Each
medicine has a unique reimbursement price, ranging
from 30-100% of the retail price. These reimbursement
prices are changed regularly but these changes are typi-
cally not related to changes in retail prices.
We conducted multiple regression analysis on 19 of the
top 30 selling medicines which met our sample size inclu-
sion criteria that required at least seventeen quarters of
competitor price data, including three quarters of data
before RPI introduction and at least nine quarters of RPI
price data. In quarters with missing data due to sparse pur-
chases, we imputed the price and number of transactions
using the adjacent quarters.
We estimated competitor prices for 3 time periods: the
immediate price change from the quarter before the RPI
was introduced to the quarter after the RPI was introduced
(Table 3, Column B), quarterly trends prior to the RPI
introduction (Table 3, Column C), and the long term
quarterly price trends after the RPI introduction (Table 3,
Column D). When quarterly price trends before RPI intro-
duction are equal to quarterly price trends after RPI intro-
duction, we present the overall quarterly rate of change
(Table 3, Column E). Statistical significance is defined as
p ≤ 0.05.
We conducted model checking diagnostics, including a
test for residual autocorrelation, to ensure our model was
Creation of Analytic Data Set from Medicines Insurance ClaimsFigure 1
Creation of Analytic Data Set from Medicines Insurance Claims.
162,999 claims
162,375 claims
159,521 claims
155,680 claims
155,616 claims
(clean data set)
27,178 claims
Analytic Dataset
18,012 claims
11,217 claims
Competitor Pharmacies
6,795 claims
Rural Pharmacy Initiative
reimbursement price=0 (n=624 claims)
Difference between total retail price on claim and  
sum of published reimbursement price and patient 
co-pay on claim is >20% (n=2,854 claims)
Difference between reimbursement price on 
claim and published reimbursement price is >20% 
(n=3,841 claims)
Invalid claims for quantity sold (not a multiple of 
package size) (n=64 claims)
Non-Jumgal Districts (n=128,438 claims)
Not one of the 30 most commonly sold medicines 
by volume (n=9,161 claims) or outside the valid 
time period for RPI (n=5)
Ak Taala, Alai, At Bashi, 
Jumgal, Kochkor, Naryn, 
Toktogul, Ton Districts
Exclusion CriteriaInclusion CriteriaPage 4 of 15
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account price dispersion because it utilizes all price val-
ues, not just average price. But we present the average
price to facilitate interpretation of the results. We con-
ducted all descriptive and multivariate analyses using SAS
9.1 (SAS Institute, Carey, NC).
Results
Descriptive analyses reveal that prices for 21 of 30 (70%)
competitor medicines changed by at least 10% to mimic
RPI prices after the introduction of the RPI. Prices for 17
of 30 (57%) competitor medicines decreased at least 10%,
with price decreases ranging 10-64.3% (Figure 2). Prices
for 4 of 30 (13%) competitor medicines increased more
than 10%, with price increases ranging 12.1-222.2%,
apparently in response to RPI prices introduced at higher
rates than those charged by competitors. Nine of 30
(30%) competitor medicines revealed price changes +/-
9.9% after the RPI introduction.
Detailed information on specific medicine price changes
is provided in Table 2. Among the seventeen competitor
medicine prices that decreased at least 10% after RPI
introduction, six, seven, and four medicines showed price
reductions of 41-64%, 20-40%, and 10-19%, respectively.
Among the four competitor medicines that increased
more than 10% after RPI introduction, three were iron-
containing medicines.
Two examples where competitor medicine prices
decreased after RPI introduction are provided in Figures 3
and 4. Figure 3 reveals dramatic competitor price reduc-
tions for metronidazole 500mg vaginal suppositories
where the competitor price decreases immediately from
11.9 Kyrgyz Som/suppository prior to RPI introduction to
7.9 in the following quarter. The quarterly trends continue
downward to a final price of 6.5 Kyrgyz Som/suppository
at the end of the study period.
In Figure 4, the competitor price for enalapril 20mg tab-
lets (Ednyt®) was 10.5 Kyrgyz Som/tablet in the quarter
prior to the introduction of RPI pharmacies. The RPI entry
price was 5.4 Kyrgyz Som but they soon increased their
price to 8.1 Kyrgyz Som. A few quarters later, the compet-
itors priced their product to mimic the RPI prices, also
ending at 8.1 Kyrgyz Som at the end of the study.
Competitor medicine price changes after the RPI introductionFigur  2
Competitor medicine price changes after the RPI introduction. Price change from quarter before observation of first 
RPI price to last study observation price.
9
4
17
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Price change          
+/- 9.9%
Price increased        
at least 10%
Price decreased     
at least 10%
# MedicinesPage 5 of 15
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tablets containing iron and ascorbic acid (Gyno-Tardy-
feron®) in response to these products being sold at higher
prices in RPI pharmacies. Competitor prices increased
from 3.8 Kyrgyz Som/tablet to 8.2 Kyrgyz Som/tablet after
the RPI pharmacies introduced the product at the price of
8.2 Kyrgyz Som/tablet.
Lastly, figure 6 provides an example of a medicine that
exhibits no overall price change from the quarter before
the RPI is introduced and the end of the study period.
While competitor prices fall for a brief period of time, the
pharmacies eventually revert to prices charged prior to the
introduction of the RPI.
Multivariate analysis revealed fourteen of nineteen (74%)
competitor medicines with significant price changes from
the quarter before RPI introduction to the quarter after
RPI introduction (Table 3, Column B). Nine of the nine-
teen (47%) medicines revealed price decreases, which
ranged from ranged from 0.35-4.85 Kyrgyz Som per unit,
while five of the nineteen (26%) revealed price increases,
ranging from 0.06-1.96 Kyrgyz Som per unit.
Interestingly, among medicines with differences in price
trends before and after the RPI introduction, 6 of 6
(100%) revealed downward price trends before the RPI
(Table 3, Column C). All six of these medicines revealed
significant price decreases immediately after RPI introduc-
tion (Table 3, Column B) with long term prices remaining
relatively unchanged (Table 3, Column D).
Mixed results are noted among thirteen medicines with no
differences in price trends before and after RPI introduc-
tion. Seven of these 13 (54%) medicines showed down-
ward price trends, while prices for 3 of the 13 (23%)
trended upward (Table 3, Column E). For most of these
medicines, the changes in price trends over time (Table 3,
Column E) are far less than those observed immediately
after the introduction of the RPI (Table 3, Column B).
Discussion
This study confirms the success of the RPI as an innova-
tive, not-for-profit option for promoting medicine price
competition in Kyrgyzstan, and ultimately increasing
access to medicines. The RPI not only addressed geo-
graphic access by enabling rural residents to buy medi-
Price changes for metronidazole 500 mg vaginal suppositoriesFigure 3
Price changes for metronidazole 500 mg vaginal suppositories.
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competition in private pharmacies located in the district
center. Thus, the RPI's impact was far greater than antici-
pated as the new pharmacies managed also to increase
access to medicines in other villages through the compet-
itive price reductions they engendered. The ultimate result
was more affordable medicine for both villagers and resi-
dents of the district center. It is worth noting, however,
that for some medicines, when the RPI introduced prices
higher than competitor prices, the competitor increased
their prices to match those of the RPI. In this regard, the
RPI demonstrates power to drive markets both downward
and upward in price.
We do not believe the RPI resulted in the institution of a
rural market. Instead, we believe the market already
existed in Jumgal prior to the RPI and that the entry of the
not-for-profit RPI spurred a more competitive market.
Indeed, demand for medicines was already documented
before the RPI when villagers identified access to medi-
cines as their number one health concern. On the supply
side, medicines were available in the rayon center, but not
in the villages themselves. Prior to the establishment of
the RPI, villagers either hired a taxi to deliver medicines
from existing pharmacies to their homes or they secured
some means of transport to travel outside the village to
the nearest pharmacy. The establishment of the RPI, there-
fore, took business away from the existing pharmacies
despite being located far away. The emergence of the RPI
pharmacies also seems to have stimulated expansion of
the private sector into new villages. Owners of pharmacies
in the rayon center opened two branch pharmacies in two
of the larger villages, perhaps in an attempt to minimize
loss of business in the rayon center.
While we have no means to assess price collusion, we sus-
pect that some degree of collusion existed among the pri-
vate pharmacies that were established prior to the RPI. We
therefore suspect the introduction of the RPI disrupted
any existing price collusion in the region. Given that our
study tracks prices for three years after the establishment
of the RPI, we suspect the competitors' price reactions are
sustained and not a one-off reaction to the RPI.
When the competitors change prices to mimic RPI medi-
cine prices, their prices are often near identical to the RPI
prices. We were unable to fully ascertain how the compet-
itors gained market intelligence on RPI medicine prices.
Price changes for enalapril 20 mg tablets (Ednyt®)Figure 4
Price changes for enalapril 20 mg tablets (Ednyt®).
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instructed to display all medicines with price tags affixed
to their packages. When interviewed a few months later,
the nurses told investigators that they no longer displayed
medicine prices because employees from competitor
pharmacies would visit RPI pharmacies and record medi-
cine prices. The RPI nurses, management, and others were
greatly concerned about predatory pricing by competitor
pharmacies. The RPI was quite fragile when first estab-
lished and many feared the existing private sector pharma-
cies would intentionally undercut RPI prices in order to
drive them out of business. Our results suggest that com-
petitors are still obtaining price information from RPI
pharmacies even though price tags are no longer affixed.
While our study provides compelling results, it has limita-
tions. First, we were only able to access prices for those
medicines covered by the Health Insurance Fund. The sale
of all medicines covered by the Health Insurance Fund,
however, accounted for 51% of total RPI revenue in the
fourth quarter of 2007 [41]. Because these pharmacies
serve sparsely-populated rural regions, small sample sizes
limited us to analyzing only 19 of the 30 top-selling med-
icines with multivariate methods. Some medicines that
passed our sample size criteria for multivariate analysis
had limited insurance claims prior to or after RPI intro-
duction. We utilized a linear model that assumes a rela-
tively constant quarter-on-quarter price change. Given
that we only observed seventeen quarters of data, we
believe the linear assumption is reasonable. Model check-
ing diagnostics, such as test for residual autocorrelation,
showed that our model is adequate for our purposes.
Furthermore, we note that to make optimum use of space,
we provided price trends in graphic form for only four of
the thirty medicines studied, however a full set of figures
is provided in Additional File 1. Figures provided in this
paper depict the three types of competitor price changes
observed after the introduction of the RPI-price decreases,
price increases, and no price changes-and are representa-
tive of the medicines in each price change category. We
had no means to determine why some medicines exhib-
ited dramatic price changes and others remained
unchanged. While we had no data on the quality of med-
icines, we do not believe that quality confounded our
price findings. For branded generic medicines, we assume
Price changes for ferrous sulfate+ascorbic acid (Gyno-Tardyferon®) tabletsFigure 5
Price changes for ferrous sulfate+ascorbic acid (Gyno-Tardyferon®) tablets.
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RPI pharmacies. Because the RPI and non-RPI pharmacies
purchase medicines from the same wholesalers in
Bishkek, we assume quality of non-branded generic med-
icines is comparable. We have no evidence of pharmacies
over-charging insurers, however we expect it happens to
some degree. Over-charging is less likely to happen within
the RPI because it is supervised by staff from the Manda-
tory Health Insurance Fund.
While research on market impact is typically complicated
due to many concurrent interventions and changing mar-
ket conditions, we are confident that the market in Jumgal
is truly local and has no other large-scale interventions
that might be responsible for our findings. Indeed, even
an annual inflation of 10% [42] did not seem to affect
medicine prices in this region over the study period. We
decided to use current medicine prices in lieu of adjusting
prices for inflation after noting that most medicine prices
trended downward or remained unchanged over the 4
years and did not seem to follow the national inflation
rate. We are not sure why medicine price trends are incon-
sistent with national inflation trends. We suspect that
medicine prices were already priced at the highest prices
the market could bear or that national inflation rates sim-
ply do not represent the price trends in rural medicine
markets. Lastly, we have no means of determining if the
market existing prior to the RPI was competitive or collu-
sive with regards to price setting.
Our study was designed only to assess whether the RPI
induced regional price competition and not to evaluate
rational use of medicines in RPI pharmacies. Others have
shown that perverse incentives to misuse medicines may
result when prescribers benefit from medicine sales [43].
In this study, we note that ampicillin injection has the
highest sales volume and the largest number of insurance
claims (Table 2), suggesting overuse of both antibiotics
and injections. Additional research is needed to assess the
impact of the RPI on rational use of medicines.
Similarly, our study does not aim to explain why the RPI
has been successful or how the RPI has been sustainable
amidst other documented failures to increase access to
medicines in rural regions. The RPI may offer a model that
can be scaled up across many more regions and in other
parts of Central Asia, but it is important to first determine
the most critical elements that led to its success. While we
Price changes for erythromycin 250 mg tabletsFigure 6
Price changes for erythromycin 250 mg tablets.
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Table 2: Descriptive results of RPI and competitor prices for the 30 highest volume insurance medicines before and after RP
Volume Rank* Total # Claims
(RPI and Competitor)
Generic 
Medicine Name
(Brand Name)
Average Initial Price per Unit (SD) 
in Kyrgyz Som
Aver
Before RPI 
Introduction
After RPI 
Introduction
Competitor RPI Co
1* 630 1,923 ampicillin 500 mg 
injection
7.6
(0.6)
6.0
(0.0)
2 0 494 amoxicillin 250 mg 
capsules
3.0***
(0.0)
2.5
(0.0)
3* 467 1,138 benzylpenicillin 1 g 
injection
5.0
(0.0)
4.8
(0.2)
4* 67 680 erythromycin 250 
mg tablets
3.3
(0.2)
2.5
(0.0)
5* 130 870 amoxicillin 250 mg 
tablets
3.0
(0.7)
2.6
(0.2)
6* 342 779 atenolol 50 mg 
tablets
1.6
(0.1)
1.1
(0.0)
7* 3 544 ciprofloxacin 250 
mg tablets
4.3
(0.5)
2.4
(0.5)
8* 130 1,036 enalapril 20 mg 
tablets
(Ednyt®)
10.5
(1.0)
5.4
(0.0)
9* 515 760 metronidazole 250 
m tablets
1.0
(0.2)
0.8
(0.0)
10* 5 226 ferrous 
sulfate+folic 
acid+ascorbic acid 
tablets
(Gyno-
Tardyferon®)
3.8
(1.6)
8.2
(0.0)
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11* 12 214 carbamazepine 200 
mg tablets
1.9
(0.6)
2.0
(0.0)
1.5
(0.1)
12* 3 268 ferrous 
sulfate+ascorbic 
acid tablets
(Taryferon®)
2.7
(0.0)
7.3
(0.0)
8.7
(1.2)
13 43 314 enalapril 10 mg 
tablets
(Ednyt®)
6.9
(1.2)
5.1
(0.2)
5.0
(0.6)
14 150 429 co-trimoxazole 
480 mg tablets
2.6
(0.3)
1.8
(0.0)
2.7
(0.3)
15 0 187 iron combination 
tablets
(Ferum Lek®)
6.4**
(1.0)
10.0
(0.0)
7.5
(1.9)
16* 53 209 nifedipine 20 mg 
retard tablets
(Corinafar 
Retard®)
3.3
(0.9)
3.6
(0.3)
3.7
(0.7)
17* 7 49 Prednisolone 5 mg 
tablets
1.1
(0.1)
1.3
(0.4)
0.5
(0.0)
18* 138 193 diclofenac 25 mg 
tablets
(Ortophen®)
0.7
(0.2)
0.4
(0.0)
0.6
(0.1)
19 114 197 ampicillin 250 mg 
tablets
1.9
(0.1)
1.4
(0.0)
1.5
(0.0)
20 484 395 co-trimoxazole 
480 mg Tablets
(Biseptol®)
4.0
(0.0)
2.2
(0.0)
3.5
(0.0)
21 43 74 drotaverine 40 mg 
tablets
(No-Spa®)
2.4
(0.2)
2.3
(0.0)
2.5
(0.0)
22 28 110 metronidazole 250 
mg tablets
(Trichopol®)
3.5
(0.4)
2.1
(0.0)
3.5
(0.0)
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23* 73 548 metronidazole 500 
mg vaginal 
suppositories
11.9
(5.3)
5.2
(0.0)
6.5
(0.8)
24 13 60 ferrous 
sulfate+ascorbic 
acid drag
(Ferroplek®)
1.5
(0.5)
0.8
(0.0)
1.5
(0.0)
25* 445 927 diclofenac 75 mg 
injection
8.1
(1.0)
3.9
(0.4)
6.0
(0.2)
26 140 226 bromhexine 8 mg 
tablets
0.5
(0.1)
0.3
(0.0)
0.4
(0.1)
27* 64 336 omeprazole 20 mg 
capsules
5.9
(0.5)
5.1
(0.6)
3.4
(1.0)
28* 70 113 ketotifen tablets 1.4
(0.3)
0.8
(0.0)
0.8
(0.0)
29* 269 216 doxycycline 100 
mg capsules
2.8
(0.0)
1.3
(0.2)
1.0
(0.0)
30 3 56 verapamil 80 mg 
tablets
2.2
(0.5)
1.2
(0.0)
1.6
(0.0)
*Used in time-series analyses
**Difference in competitors' price from the quarter before the RPI was introduced to the end of the study period
***No price for quarter before RPI intro; this price from quarter where RPI price first appears
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Table 3: Multivariate results of competitor price trends for 19 medicines before and after RPI introduction
Price Trends Before RPI are NOT Equal to Price 
Trends After RPI
Price Trends Before 
RPI are Equal to Price 
Trends After RPI
A B C D E
Medicine Immediate price effect 
of RPI§
Quarterly price trends 
before RPI
Quarterly price trends 
after RPI
Quarterly price trends 
before and after RPI
ampicillin 500 mg injection -1.19** -0.27** 0.01
atenolol 50 mg tablets -0.52** -0.14* -0.05
metronidazole 250 mg 
tablets
-0.35** -0.03** 0.01
carbamazepine 200 mg 
tablets
-1.04* -0.22* -0.02
diclofenac 75 mg injection -2.33** -0.34** -0.07
doxycycline 100 mg 
capsules
-1.19** -0.08** -0.03
benzylpenicillin 1 g 
injection
0.06* -0.02**
erythromycin 250 mg 
tablets
-0.07 -0.01
amoxicillin 250 mg tablets 0.20* -0.05**
ciprofloxacin 250 mg 
tablets
-0.73* -0.01
enalapril 20 mg tablets 
(Ednyt®)
-0.18 -0.21**
ferrous sulfate+folic 
acid+ascorbic acid tablets 
(Gyno-Tardyferon®)
1.96* 0.26**
ferrous sulfate+ascorbic 
acid tablets (Taryferon®)
1.40 0.29**
nifedipine 20 mg retard 
tablets (Corinafar Retard®)
0.93* -0.06
prednisolone 5 mg tablets 0.38 -0.10*
diclofenac 25 mg tablets 
(Ortophen®)
-0.05 -0.01*
metronidazole 500 mg 
vaginal suppositories
-4.85** -0.27**
omeprazole 20mg capsules 0.75* -0.30**
ketotifen tablets 0.18 -0.08**
§ Difference in competitor price from the quarter before to the quarter after the RPI was introduced
*p ≤ 0.05
**p < 0.0001
International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:43 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/43cannot pinpoint theses critical components, we note the
key characteristics of the RPI, including the role of highly
trained and motivated players who genuinely wanted to
develop and test new ways to increase access to essential
medicines in rural areas. These staff devoted a great deal
of their personal time and energy to seeing the project
through, and it would be a mistake to overlook or under-
estimate the value of this social capital, especially in post-
Soviet Central Asia. From a social and political stand-
point, the climate of Kyrgyzstan is recognized as being
more conducive to civil society than that of any of its
neighbors in Central Asia. However, with the exception of
a few very strong professional organizations, the country's
health sector NGOs tend to be less evolved than the NGO
managing the RPI. In addition, the NGOs tend to be
rather fractured, often working from outside the govern-
ment rather than in collaboration with it. We therefore see
a need for donors, international organizations, and gov-
ernments to assist in reorganizing and building the capac-
ity of existing NGOs to refocus their social capital toward
more concrete activities, such as establishing and oversee-
ing the RPIs.
Understanding that the majority of people in developing
countries still seek care from pharmacies rather than pub-
lic sector health facilities, many donors have been eager to
develop private sector interventions but have been wary of
engaging directly with the private sector. At the same time,
donors are eager to establish and promote community-
based programs and civil society. The non-profit nature
and involvement of civil society organizations in the rural
pharmacy initiative model could provide donors with an
opportunity to accomplish multiple goals without com-
promising their non-profit missions.
Lastly, the study reveals the utility of data on medicines
that are routinely collected through mechanisms such as
insurance schemes. These types of data sources are rich
and should be used to build a solid body of evidence to
guide policy on access to medicines for the poor. Research
on interventions to increases access to medicines must
include assessment of potential impact on both formal
and informal markets. More work is needed to identify
incentives for NGOs and other non-profits to engage in
the establishment and management of rural pharmacies
that can compete with existing private pharmacies. This
should include determination of the operating costs to
establish and maintain rural pharmacies and the mini-
mum mark-ups needed to sustain these pharmacies, as
well as pricing policies that promote rational use of med-
icines. Additional research is also needed to examine pol-
icies and programs that promote and impede competition
in the pharmaceutical sector, including description of
market size and structure, presence or absence of compe-
tition laws, price regulation, barriers to market entry, and
marketing.
Conclusion
Initiatives designed to increase equitable access to medi-
cines in rural regions of developing and transitional coun-
tries should consider the potential to leverage medicine
price competition as a means of achieving their goal. The
inclusion of civil-society organizations and non-govern-
mental organizations in the design and management of
these initiatives, in collaboration with governments and
international organizations, provides opportunities for
capacity building, health sector development, and busi-
ness development in rural regions that are often
neglected.
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